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SHARPENING THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN (TEP) FOCUS:
THE IMPACT OF HIGHER ORDER BELIEFS AND VALUES

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract Addressing societal factors in military planning poses many challenges, not least of which is the inherent doubt that there is or can be a useful model. Furthermore, there is widespread disagreement about the impact and direction of modern phenomena such as globalization and modernization. The very existence of the debate suggests, however, that differences abound, the most fundamental of which are the worldviews, values, and beliefs that have been molded across the generations in every culture and civilization.		
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ABSTRACT

Addressing societal factors in military planning poses many challenges, not least of which is the inherent doubt that there is or can be a useful model. Furthermore, there is widespread disagreement about the impact and direction of modern phenomena such as globalization and modernization. The very existence of the debate suggests, however, that differences abound, the most fundamental of which are the worldviews, values, and beliefs that have been molded across the generations in every culture and civilization. Conscientiously considering them during the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) drafting process will enable an enhanced level of effectiveness. Additionally, the paper proposes several corollaries concerning doctrine, the interagency process, and training.

TEPs, a relatively new element in the Department of Defense's "Family of Plans," strive to enable U.S. forces to affect the strategic environment favorably during peacetime. This "soft" mission will not appeal to many, but the military, widely engaged with counterparts and civilians of other nations throughout the world, has an extraordinary opportunity to contribute to a safer, saner world.

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SHARPENING THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN (TEP) FOCUS: THE IMPACT OF HIGHER ORDER BELIEFS AND VALUES

The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat.

Hart-Rudman Commission

Most citizens, diplomats, politicians, and senior military leaders probably agree that nation-states are the relevant agents in matters of political discourse. It is a limited perspective, however, as it covers only the international arena where nations sign treaties and conduct their daily affairs. The aspect it erroneously overlooks is the radically important underlying beliefs and values that manifest themselves irrespective of political borders or governments that change over time. It seems intuitively apparent that joining the two views into a larger picture is desirable.

The Department of Defense (DoD) may be able to improve the theater engagement piece of the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) by taking beliefs and values explicitly into the calculus. Because of the enduring nature of beliefs and values, this paper suggests that the long-term perspective is particularly relevant. As a collateral advantage, the other DPP elements and even crisis action planning may benefit. If theater engagement plans (TEPs) will be improved by considering higher order beliefs and values, they might be further enhanced by encouraging the interagency process. In any case, the "shaping" leg of the National Military Strategy (NMS) may be strengthened.

To provide a plausible basis on which to build, the paper will employ the recognized scholarly accomplishments of the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington's work has been widely discussed for its value in showing that civilizations, a concept to be explained below, are key to analyzing beliefs and values.

The focus of this paper is an analysis of higher order cultural values in the preparation of TEPs. It will have nothing to do directly with the problems associated with U.S. Code Title 10 issues or the budget process other than to acknowledge that the Unified Command Commander (CINC) is bereft of real authority to implement the TEP independently of the Services—a serious impediment to using a potent tool.¹

For any number of reasons, there are different judgments about TEP. Some people may dismiss a broader engagement effort as meaningless sensitivity training. Others see an attempt to justify meddling or imperialist intervention. Still others are wary of entangling the military in peacetime operations. Regardless of the viewpoint, at a minimum, a more thorough analysis and planning process cannot but help in understanding a potential enemy. Knowledge surely has great value, as joint doctrine proclaims to be especially true in military operations other than war (MOOTW).² Sun Tzu, no pacifist, declared: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."³ It is important to note the enduring objective: to subdue the enemy. Sun Tzu further teaches: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁴ One takes positive steps to deflect hostile acts by understanding and preparing to deal with the underlying factors. Assessment of the relevant factors can only lead to the creation of invaluable knowledge about the world and its challenges, and without which people and nations thrash about, as on a stormy sea.

¹ See, for example, Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *"Shaping" the World Through "Engagement:" Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000).

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 24 May 2000), I-3.

³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 84.

The single most dramatic modern event drawing attention to one of the higher order values systems is the September 11, 2001 multi-pronged attack on the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the jetliner in western Pennsylvania. In consequence, America and her allies, consonant with the United Nations,⁵ find themselves fighting a non-governmental organization (NGO), the Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden, rather than a state. That the corresponding war-like effort is directed against an NGO is not half as important as the fact that its *raison d'être* has its roots in a transnational phenomenon, Islamism,⁶ probably little understood and greatly underestimated by the majority of the West's citizens. A significant part of the challenge for the West and, presumably, other non-Islamic civilizations, is to understand its underlying cause and, thereby, come to a fair estimate of its aspirations. Such a process requires a new way of thinking.

"Another prevalent pattern of thinking and discussion about counter-terrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a rejection of accommodation and finesse. If counter-terrorism is conceived as a war, it is a small step to conclude that in this war there is no substitute for victory and thus no room for compromise. The nature of terrorism and of how American public attention to it has evolved in recent years have made the topic prone to this simplistic pattern of thought. Americans have had little reason to come to terms with the causes or issues associated with the terrorism that has struck closest to their homes and been emblazoned most prominently in their newspapers and their memories. They have had more reason to think of terrorism simply as an evil to be eradicated, rather than a more complex phenomenon with sides that may need to be reckoned with differently."⁷

⁵ United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 1368 (2001)*, 4370th Meeting, S/RES/1368(2001) (New York: 2001).

⁶ "Islamism" and "Islamist" have become the more or less common terms of reference for radical, political Islam and an adherent, respectively. Even though many Muslims actively work for the spread of their religion, most, seemingly, abhor the extremes of organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and similar organizations. Accordingly, one does well to speak carefully so as not to condemn the innocent by association.

⁷ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), 5-6.

All members of the Armed Forces have an extraordinary opportunity to reckon differently with other people and cultures.⁸ As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) says, "U.S. armed forces have an essential role in shaping the global security environment by promoting regional stability, preventing or reducing conflicts or threats, and deterring aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in key regions of the world. *Each region of the world presents its own unique challenges and opportunities* for U.S. security."⁹ CJCS unambiguously acknowledges the importance of conducting continuous strategic assessments that connect with force structure and planning.¹⁰

These opportunities will be most effectively carried out within the context of the very intentional TEP, wherein CINCs devise specific actions in view of the region's situation.¹¹ TEPs "reflect the importance of military engagement activities in helping to shape the international security environment in peacetime."¹² Herein lies a challenge for planners whose first—but not only—priority will be the lethal force aspects. TEPs require that they not overlook or discount the value of non-lethal options. Neglecting application of non-lethal options clearly minimizes linkage with the National Security Strategy (NSS), the NMS, and the other elements of national power. Collaborative involvement in the interagency process

⁸ The word *culture* should be taken as the equivalent for *civilization* in the context of this paper, the latter being somewhat awkward of use, even though it will be frequently employed to reinforce the thesis. A subsequent section will clarify this matter further.

⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* 98-1, CJCSI 3110.01B (Washington, 15 November 2001), D-C-2. SECRET. Italics added.

¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, CJCSI 3100.01A (Washington, DC: 1999), E2-E5.

¹¹ See Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning*, CJCSM 3113.01A (Washington, DC: 2000).

¹² CJCSI 3110.01B, B-2.

offers the best insurance against inefficient or counterproductive efforts within the context of the NSS and the NMS.

Within a very complicated process, the overarching instruction covering TEPs identifies several key areas requiring intelligence processing, including global military, political, technical, cultural, and sociological trends and nature of warfare; regional instability; transnational threats, international organized crime, international organizations, and other non-state actors; and humanitarian concerns. An additional assignment for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is to "Update the baseline intelligence threat assessment when significant, unanticipated issues and developments emerge."¹³ The problem, of course, entails identifying emerging factors and deciding when they cross the significance threshold to create a threat or threat-in-being. Had the rise of Islamist radicalism been correctly discerned ten to fifteen years ago, maybe current events would be unfolding very much differently. Perhaps it is a noteworthy example of subconscious cultural filters and blocks.

CINCS, as the agents responsible for TEPs, face three significant challenges, two of which are conceptual and possibly without measurability. First, peacetime engagement has a lower priority for the armed forces.¹⁴ Preparing and training for the lethal work done only by the armed forces occupies almost all available time and resources. Second, shaping extends beyond the focus and time horizon normally dealt with by both operational and strategic planners as they prepare operational, contingency, and functional plans that are only activated when needed, and then probably for a relatively small amount of time. A TEP, on the

¹³ CJCSI 3100.01A, E-3.

¹⁴ CJCSI 3110.01B, B-3. The priorities are: (1) Operational Plans (OPLANS); (2) Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) with Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD); (3) CONOPS and Functional Plans likely to be executed; (4) Remaining CONOPS and functional plans; and (5) Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs).

other hand, is intended to have an effect beginning with its implementation and extending in time for many years. Additionally, the results of shaping activities may be measurable only implicitly by what they presumably prevent. In other words, there is no way to prove a negative. There is no obvious or quantifiable measure of merit or effectiveness unlike those presented in a Department of State mission performance plan (MPP).¹⁵ Third, the concept of shaping, especially as treated in this paper, entails consideration of debatable—though clearly important—factors and concepts such as civilizations and modal personality, to be introduced later.

The National Command Authority (NCA) provides strategic guidance in the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which CJCS translates into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). On that basis, the CINCs plan. CINCs create their TEPs in light of the Prioritized Regional Objectives (PROs).¹⁶ It is not at all clear that the TEP process takes place with consistent conscious regard for the overarching NSS and NMS and in collaboration with other government or civilian agents of national power.

Regional objectives and their prioritization need explanation and interpretation because of their geographic orientation and differences in their relative importance, depending on whose scheme is to be followed. The regions reflect more closely the Department of State's organization of the political world, not that of the Department of Defense.

Furthermore, the Chairman's interpretation of the Secretary's prioritizations as compared in

¹⁵ See *Mission Performance Plan India FY 2000-2002*. [n.p.: n.d.] (U.S. Naval War College reprint NWC2139/FOUO.) The plan addresses eighteen areas from economics to information technology to travel. Each area includes a statement concerning goals, the U.S. interest, mission strategy, mission objectives, performance indicators, and a performance report.

¹⁶ Jordan, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 6-7.

Table I may hinder creativity in the TEP process. This will be the basis for a later recommendation.

TABLE I -- *Comparison of TEP Prioritization Categories in the Department of Defense*

Tier	Secretary ¹⁷	Chairman ¹⁸
I	Shaping activities to be carried out.	Vital national interests are those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the nation. The US will do what it must to defend these interests, including, when necessary, using military might unilaterally and decisively.
II	Shaping activities to be carried out to the extent possible.	Important national interests are those that do not affect national survival, but do affect national well being and the character of the world. In such cases, the US will use its resources to advance these interests insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake.
III	Shaping activities to be carried out as resources permit	Humanitarian and other interests. In some circumstances, the nation may act because U.S. values demand a response such as response to natural and manmade disasters.

The TEP process generally may need further administrative and substance improvements, at least according to some authors.¹⁹ The remainder of this paper will focus on another way to improve the utility of the product.

SEEING HIGHER ORDER VALUES

A sculptor in Oregon was asked what he was going to carve from a rough block of black walnut wood. He said would know only after he started. He first needed to "see" what was in the raw material. Only then could he begin work. This sculptor believed that, while he could give form to any of a large number of possibilities, only one was ideal for the material at hand. Interestingly, the artist did not know for certain, however, that he would uncover the ideal shape, but that is what he must attempt. The sculptor's seeing equates with the concept of devising a TEP.

¹⁷ William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1999* (Washington, DC: 1999), 17. Quoted in Jordan, et al., *op. cit.*, 7.

¹⁸ CJCSM 3113.01A, GL-6.

¹⁹ See Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?" *Parameters*, 30 (Spring 2000).

Key factors to understanding a culture or society are its hierarchy of worldview, values, beliefs, and behavior. It is important to note that these features are not equally susceptible to change. Worldview is least flexible because it addresses the most fundamental explanations that people have for the world, why it exists, and what role humanity plays in it. Values, typically derived from the worldview, affect how people judge something as right or wrong, good or bad.²⁰ Values tend to change only very slowly. Beliefs are mostly cognitive assessments of the world, and will change as evidence accumulates to support a change. Values and beliefs tend to move somewhat in tandem. Behavior is most amenable to modification when reason and circumstances so dictate. Taken as a whole, these features can be summed into a national or cultural modal personality.

It almost seems foolhardy to discuss national character or modal personalities because, as Alex Inkeles begins his book *National Character*, "[It] is about a subject that some people believe does not exist."²¹ Evidence exists to the contrary, however. Part of the older literature, using poorly selected subjects, focused on race and genetics, leaving the field in bad odor.²² Recent studies, however, show with statistical reliability that real differences exist.²³ Thus, scholars could report, for example, that Americans are trusting, or that Germans respect authority. Even as national modal personalities can and should be entered into the TEP calculus, there is another, even larger, concept that proves helpful: civilizations.

²⁰ For an informal comparison of values across cultures, see the appendix, Table VI.

²¹ Alex Inkeles, *National Character* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), vii.

²² *Ibid.*, 359-366.

²³ *Ibid.*, 279-283.

Civilizations are a widely defining concept. In some ways, though, a civilization is culture, broadly understood.²⁴ A civilization may be identical to a state, as in Japan, or it may encompass multiple states. Table II shows modern civilizations and their approximate claims to 1993's population of 5.3 billion people as categorized by Samuel P. Huntington.²⁵

TABLE II -- *World Civilizations and Their Populations*
(thousands)

Civilization	Population
Sinic	1,340,900
Islamic	927,600
Hindu	915,800
Western	805,400
Latin American	507,500
African	392,100
Orthodox	261,300
Japanese	124,700

Huntington's approach uses five traits. First, civilizations are considered in the plural, meaning that the distinction is not between barbarians and civilized but of recognizable entities. Second, there is an element of cultural identity or a way of life. Third, civilizations are comprehensive in the sense that they are the highest cultural grouping below that of species. Fourth, they outlast governments and ideological upheavals. They have historical continuity. Fifth, they typically encompass multiple states, with Japan being the exception.²⁶

Except for the Islamic and Latin American civilizations, each of Huntington's civilizations contains at least one core state. South Africa is the emerging apparent core state for the sub-Saharan African civilization; England, France, Germany, and the US share the role for the West; China for the Sinic; India for the Hindu; and Russia for the Orthodox.

²⁴ Unfortunately, the literature employs no single definition; some ambiguity will have to be accepted.

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 85. Huntington allows that the Latin American and African civilizations have not yet achieved the degree of definition as the others. In fact, Latin America, having been heavily influenced by Europe, could be considered a sub-set of Western civilization.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-44.

Except for its institutionalized secularism, Turkey might emerge as the core state for Islam. Latin America's position in the scheme is still in a state of debate.²⁷ Core states could play a vital, empathetic role in sorting out or arbitrating the issues within the civilization. Should conflict erupt, the core state would be the best mitigating influence.

Various authors have taken issue with Professor Huntington. Some of these differ with how he categorized civilizations—not that he categorized them. None apparently dispute that differences exist between nations and peoples. Others believe that his is a deterministic model, particularly with regard to economics.²⁸ In many ways, the dispute may be purely academic. It would appear that in the world of objective fact he has it essentially right.²⁹ To accept this model—or any other, for that matter—is to accept that people are different. Accordingly, cultural pluralism cannot be disregarded. Therein lies the source of the largest misconception in which a TEP could be trapped: confusing modernization with westernization.

Western civilization citizens, with a great deal of pride in their achievements, seem to believe that they are the envy of the world. Clearly, an improved standard of living is that for which many people in developing nations strive, but they do not necessarily also wish to become Westerners in the process. Therefore, one should not confuse Westernization with modernization. Modernization respects and builds on culture and civilization. Universalism, a pernicious extension of Westernization, assumes that others want and *should* adopt Western

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 45-46.

²⁸ Daniel Drezner, "Globalizers of the World, Unite!" *The Washington Quarterly*, 21 (Winter 1998), 217.

²⁹ Robert D. Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 288 (December 2001), 70ff.

culture. This is the so-called Western hubris that alienates so many people throughout the world and that can lead to violent reaction.

While not in any way condoning them, the actions of September 11 nevertheless manifest a clash of civilizations, a type of war. The attacks manifest the strength to be found in intangibles such as beliefs and values. War, considered from the sociological and political viewpoint, is often a sign of vitality, according to Matthew Melko, who writes,

"Peoples who have the energy and the capability to wage war successfully often also have the energy and capability to accomplish much in other areas. Periods of great cultural achievement and chronic war are closely related in the histories of the Italian city states, Spain, England, the Netherlands, and France. Men fight best, after all, if they consider there are values worth fighting for, and they seem to fight most violently if the cause is noble. Wars fought for the defense of a religion, or of a nation, tend to be more violent than those fought for partial political or economic advantages. Often it seems to take a war to raise men above the level of everyday petty strife, to see themselves as standing unselfishly for a greater unity."³⁰

Melko's insight is that respect for civilizations will decrease the threat to survival and make it possible to enter into constructive engagement for the good of all concerned.

Engaging other civilizations presents complex and occasionally intractable problems. For example, modernization requires participation in the global economy. Civilizations that fail to respect the value of capital, however, will struggle to participate. Islam, in particular, faces a modernization challenge because of its approach to the accumulation of capital and the creation of corporations hobbles participation in a free-market economy.³¹ Globalization requires a speed in action and reaction that challenges underdeveloped nations, however congenial they are with free market economics. For them, an adjustable shock absorber is needed.

³⁰ Matthew Melko, *The Nature of Civilization* (Boston: Porter Sargeant Publisher, 1969), 58.

³¹ See, for example, Dr. Taha Jabir Al-'Alwani and Waleed Adel El-Ansary, *Linking Ethics and Economics: The Role of Ijtihad in the Regulation and Correction of Capital Markets* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: History and International Affairs, 1999). There currently are literally dozens of articles and books on this topic.

RISK IN DISREGARDING HIGHER ORDER VALUES: WHY THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Numerous areas of the world will almost certainly give birth to conflict in future years. Table III highlights possibilities, identifying their responsible CINC. Table IV recasts those areas in terms of civilizations. If the unified commands were organized with an eye to cultural and civilizational realities, they arguably might well find themselves able to analyze and meet their challenges more effectively and efficiently. At a minimum, CINCs could benefit by specifically consulting with one another at the level of cultures and civilizations. For example, only PACOM has responsibility for the Republic of the Philippines and the nations of southeast Asia. In both, there is an Islamic factor. PACOM, however, is not alone in needing to consider Islamic civilization. Working with the other affected CINCs may facilitate analysis and planning.

TABLE III – *Potential World Trouble Spots*

Area of the World	Geographic Unified Command (CINC)				
	Europe	Central	Joint Forces	Southern	Pacific
Middle East	X	X			
Philippines					X
North Africa		X			
Central Asia	X	X			
Columbia			X	X	
Argentina			X	X	
SE Asia					X
Russia	X	X	X		X
Balkans	X				

TABLE IV – *Civilizations within the Purview of Unified Commanders*

Civilization	Geographic Unified Command (CINC)				
	Europe	Central	Joint Forces	Southern	Pacific
Islamic	X	X			X
Japan					X
Latin American			X	X	
Hindu		X			X
Sinic					X
Western	X	X	X	X	X

Civilization	Geographic Unified Command (CINC)				
	Europe	Central	Joint Forces	Southern	Pacific
African		X	X		
Orthodox	X	X	X		X

Even if one were disinclined to consider higher order beliefs and values on their merits, they will become a more serious consideration simply by virtue of their becoming more widespread in the world's population.³² Additionally, the age pyramid is flattening, meaning that young people form a larger portion of the population.³³ "The world's poorest and often most politically unstable countries—including, among others, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen—will have the largest youth populations through 2020." The bulge in sub-Saharan Africa and the continuing large numbers of young people in the Middle East present serious challenges.³⁴ Regardless of the absolute number, they naturally will expect satisfaction and happiness in life, especially as the means of social communication serve to remove any remaining blinders about those who have and those who have not.

Even as young people present challenges, they also present opportunities. For example, the move towards democracy may best be driven by the restless young—as in Iran—than their seniors.³⁵ Caution should always be exercised, however, when trying to harness the energy of the young because their untamed enthusiasm unleashed may lead to the transmogrification of the objective.

³² Please refer to Table VII in the appendix for an overview of world population estimates.

³³ See also in the appendix Figures 1 and 2 that present cogent facts for Sudan. This does not suggest that Sudan is typical of all high growth countries, but it does serve to highlight rather well the nature of the problem.

³⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, *Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape* (Washington, DC: July 2001), 36f. Latin America and Asia's proportion of young people has already peaked.

A world economic future that is anything less than robust will aggravate matters to the extent that per capita income fails to improve.³⁶ Relevant to the clash of civilizations, the CIA reports that,

"The countries and regions most at risk of falling behind economically are those with endemic internal and/or regional conflicts and those that fail to diversify their economies. The economies of most states in sub-Saharan African and the Middle East and some in Latin America will continue to suffer. A large segment of the Eurasian landmass extending from Central Asia through the Caucasus to parts of southeastern Europe faces dim economic prospects. Within countries, the gap in the standard of living also will increase. Even in rapidly growing countries, large regions will be left behind."³⁷

As the gap between developed and developing nations widens, one can expect increasing frustration and a commensurate willingness to turn to violent means in an attempt to redress wrongs. The combination of high population growth, slow economic growth, and limited disposable income presents the world and many, if not all, of its civilizations with a challenge of the first order. The world can choose to suppress and punish the inevitable public expressions of frustration and outrage to come, or it can choose life. Engagement is not charity.

HOW HIGHER ORDER VALUES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Having considered the concept of civilizations, the higher order beliefs and values they embody, and the demographic and economic imperatives, it is time to formulate the key recommendation: ensure conscientious coordination of effort across unified command boundaries, focusing on the underlying civilizational forces that drive, at least in part, sub-national, national, and transnational policy and associated political phenomena ranging from

³⁵ Elaine Sciolino, "Is the Devil in the Demographics?" *The New York Times*, 9 December 2001. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/09/weekinreview/~>> [16 December 2001].

³⁶ Please see the appendix, Figure 3, for a graphic depiction of regional Gross Domestic Product.

economics to terrorism. Carl von Clausewitz had it right when he said that war is a continuation of political policy. Two observations are particularly apropos: "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." And, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."³⁸ Civilizational beliefs and values will influence strategic interests and purpose.

There are some corollaries concerning doctrine, public diplomacy, awareness of personal filters and prejudices that influence the planning process, and interagency cooperation. Application of these corollaries will enhance the usefulness of the primary recommendation.

Doctrine

TEP is an emerging process. Not only might DoD amend the TEP planning and execution processes in the future, but also the regional objectives that it addresses will change. As Table I, page 7 above, showed, CJCS narrowed the prioritization criteria to terms more suitable for the use of lethal force or the expenditure of significant resources. TEP prioritizations, however, ought to be less constrained. Specifically, the language concerning lethal force and risk should be recast into shaping, rather than defensive, terms so that Tier I priorities are those that should be carried out more diligently.

Awareness of Cultural Filters

CINCs and their planners unavoidably bring their own values and beliefs to the process. Whether they are aware of them and apply them wisely is another issue. For example, and venturing into territory where the brave dare not run, there is something of an expecta-

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts* (Washington, DC: December 2000), 35.

tion that military officers will be "conservative realists." Times continue to change, however. One officer writes, "At a minimum, realism's focus on threats may not inculcate the mindset necessary to seize opportunities for engagement and cooperation that could enhance the security of the state." Furthermore, "creativity and the flexibility to move beyond the status quo are qualities that are critical to enhance U.S. security in the current complex and fluid international system."³⁹

Education and Training

Training of forces in cross-cultural communication skills, especially those who view widespread use of English as anything other than a language of wider communication, should be a priority. Western English-speaking personnel should realize that people who speak English as a second language do not ipso facto intend to adopt Western culture. American personnel visiting foreign countries would do well to open their minds to what the host culture has to tell them. This does not mean, in any case, that Americans and other Westerners should therefore conclude that Western culture should not be extolled. It simply means that dialogue, in the full sense of that word, will likely bear much fruit in the long-term.

Interagency Collaboration

The Hart-Rudman Commission's final report to the Congress, responding to concerns about the emerging international system, says, "The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our

³⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 99.

³⁹ Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, "Huntington Revisited: Is Conservative Realism Still Essential for the Military Ethic?" *Essays 2001*. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001), 42. Allowing for the usual disclaimer that an author's opinion, conclusions, and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government, it seems noteworthy, nevertheless, that this essay appears in the collection.

challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat.⁴⁰ Clearly, the future demands coordinated action because anything less almost certainly will lead, at best, to squandering resources and time.

The U.S. Department of State (DoS), organized into six geographic bureaus, has the same inter-civilizational complexity as the Department of Defense's unified commands. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Defense do not share a common perspective as Table V shows. As part of the interagency process, DoS and DoD ought to devote some time to examining the inter-civilizational issues across their regionalization schemes.

TABLE V – *State Department Areas Covered by CINCs*

Department of Defense Unified Com- mands	Department of State Bureaus ⁴¹					
	Europe and Eurasia	South Asia	Western Hemisphere	East Asia and Pacific	Near East	Africa
EUCOM	X		X		X	
USJFCOM	X		X			
SOUTHCOM			X			
CENTCOM	X		X		X	X
PACOM	X	X		X		

Finally, take the maximum possible advantage of the CIA's capabilities with regard both to analysis and collection.⁴² This would be especially true of the HUMINT agents collect when it relates specifically to cultural aspects.

Clearly, interagency collaboration will require extensive and possibly even exhausting coordination. The result, expressed concretely in Annex "Victor" in the TEP, will almost certainly lead to improved application of national power and resources.

⁴⁰ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Washington, DC: 2001), iv; quoted in Mahoney-Norris, *op. cit.*, 45.

⁴¹ See <<http://www.state.gov>>.

⁴² Garrett Jones, "Working With the CIA," *Parameters*, 31 (Winter 2001-2), 29.

High Level Collaboration

CINCs are recognizable representatives of national power.⁴³ They may be more widely known than ambassadors. Each has a different perspective: the ambassador has a single country focus, the CINC a regional one. Furthermore, in country, an ambassador outranks the CINC. Nevertheless, a CINC may be unwillingly or unexpectedly thrust into a civil or mixed role, such as General H. Norman Schwarzkopf at the conclusion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.⁴⁴ Either way, the stakes are high. Opportunities to exercise national power can be lost. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes,

"The end of the 1991 Gulf War brought about yet another demonstration of America's congenital difficulty with translating military success into political coin. Because the United States has traditionally viewed force and power as discrete, separate, and successive phases, it has fought its wars either to unconditional surrender, which obviates the need of establishing a relationship between force and diplomacy, or it has acted as if, after victory, the military element is no longer relevant and diplomats are obliged to take over in a kind of strategic vacuum."⁴⁵

Only good political sense and perspicacity will overcome emerging difficulties.⁴⁶ Just as in the military, knowledge and awareness count. "[K]eep them informed, treat them with respect, keep them informed, be polite with their embassy staff, keep them informed, remember that embassy resources are limited, and, finally, keep them informed. Keeping the ambassador informed will make or break your relationship with him or her."⁴⁷

⁴³ Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy," *Washington Post*, 28 September 2000, A1; "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones," *Washington Post*, 29 September 2000, A1; "Standing Up to State and Congress," *Washington Post*, 30 September 2000, A1.

⁴⁴ See Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company: 1985), 443-461.

⁴⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 189.

⁴⁶ Priest, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ Jones, *op. cit.*, 37-38.

CINCs may indeed need to fill a new role as they emerge as a type of "proconsul."⁴⁸ They will walk the high wire, though. There a clear need to balance civil-military relations to achieve effective collaboration with diplomats and representatives of NGOs. As the rules and roles of the CINC change, new means must be added to their toolbox. One of those is a clear awareness of higher order values and beliefs across civilizational boundaries.

They are shapers of the future, a future for which we must fight astutely.

⁴⁸ Priest, *op. cit.*

Appendix

SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES



Figure 1 – *Sudan Population by Age Group*

Figure 2 – *Sudan Proportional Population by Age Group*

Figure 3 – *Gross Domestic Product by Region*

Table VI – *Comparative Prioritization of Cultural Values*

Table VII - *World Population*



Figure 1

Sudan Population






Figure 2

Sudan Proportionate Population



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 3
Regional Gross Domestic Product



Source: CIA's Long-Term Growth Model

TABLE VI – Comparative Prioritization of Cultural Values

Value	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Negligible
Individuality.....	W	B	E	M
Motherhood.....	B E	MW	-	-
Hierarchy.....	W E M A	B	-	-
Masculinity.....	B M E W A	-	-	-
Gratefulness.....	E A	MB	W	-
Peace.....	E	B	W A	M
Money.....	W A B	M	E	-
Modesty.....	E	B A M	-	W
Punctuality.....	W	B	M E	A
Saviorism.....	W	M	-	E B M
Karma.....	E	-	-	MW B A
Firstness.....	W	B	-	E A M
Aggressiveness.....	WB	M	A E	-
Collective Responsibility.....	E A M	B	-	W
Respect for Elders.....	E A M	B	-	W
Respect for Youth.....	W	M A B E	-	-
Hospitality to Guests.....	E A	B	MW	-
Inherited Property.....	E	-	MW A B	-
Preservation of Environment.....	E	B A	W	M
Color of Skin.....	E W B	M	-	A
Sacredness of Farmland.....	E	A	-	B M W
Equality of Women.....	W	E B	A	M
Human Dignity.....	W B	E A M	-	-
Efficiency.....	W	B	E M	-
Patriotism.....	B M A E	W	-	-
Religion.....	W B M A E	-	-	-
Authoritarianism.....	E M A	W B	-	-
Education.....	W B	B E M A	-	-
Frankness.....	W	B E M A	-	-

Legend: W = Western Cultures
E = Eastern Cultures
B = Black Cultures
A = African Cultures
M = Muslim Cultures

Source: Professor Nicholas Dima, course author, "Cross-Cultural Communications and International Relations," U.S. Naval War College, 2001.

TABLE VII – *World Population*

Age	1980		1990		2000		2010	
	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total
All ages	1,076,914,242		3,829,788,186		6,079,727,906		6,823,153,417	
0- 4	151,630,120	14%	450,657,484	12%	610,395,476	10%	620,158,361	9%
5- 9	133,395,549	12%	405,663,310	11%	598,451,485	10%	607,275,081	9%
10-14	122,360,527	11%	377,970,195	10%	609,925,384	10%	596,874,426	9%
15-19	112,252,040	10%	379,001,936	10%	562,019,586	9%	593,398,052	9%
20-24	99,275,703	9%	361,688,808	9%	516,915,624	9%	600,860,965	9%
25-29	84,722,495	8%	321,279,889	8%	502,314,246	8%	547,215,279	8%
30-34	69,001,657	6%	280,394,788	7%	474,974,710	8%	500,105,385	7%
35-39	57,847,528	5%	256,585,644	7%	424,413,953	7%	485,044,593	7%
40-44	50,163,099	5%	205,085,324	5%	369,649,999	6%	456,896,394	7%
45-49	43,910,741	4%	162,795,870	4%	330,539,005	5%	404,815,032	6%
50-54	38,691,947	4%	152,861,645	4%	265,534,688	4%	347,578,222	5%
55-59	33,018,804	3%	132,394,773	3%	209,399,813	3%	304,778,925	4%
60-64	26,381,795	2%	114,536,246	3%	185,110,740	3%	236,310,040	3%
65-69	20,798,312	2%	88,067,125	2%	150,930,850	2%	175,706,997	3%
70-74	15,016,062	1%	60,562,989	2%	118,860,363	2%	141,392,686	2%
75-79	9,743,598	1%	42,925,844	1%	79,601,955	1%	99,854,687	1%
80+	8,704,265	1%	37,316,316	1%	70,690,029	1%	104,888,292	2%

Age	2020		2030		2040		2050	
	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total	Total	% of Total
All ages	7,517,468,901		8,139,738,692		8,667,713,850		9,103,445,082	
0- 4	631,634,565	8%	625,697,085	8%	622,788,705	7%	619,759,188	7%
5- 9	618,306,451	8%	623,623,026	8%	620,636,251	7%	619,464,496	7%
10-14	609,675,379	8%	624,209,882	8%	621,024,296	7%	620,288,384	7%
15-19	603,483,954	8%	615,949,142	8%	622,501,400	7%	620,470,455	7%
20-24	588,954,985	8%	603,595,085	7%	619,969,106	7%	618,438,785	7%
25-29	578,482,105	8%	591,134,872	7%	606,742,813	7%	616,346,455	7%
30-34	581,903,980	8%	572,616,373	7%	591,629,567	7%	612,479,116	7%
35-39	527,484,606	7%	560,192,336	7%	577,183,182	7%	598,066,694	7%
40-44	480,110,977	6%	561,793,485	7%	556,130,555	6%	580,100,538	6%
45-49	463,715,981	6%	506,197,178	6%	541,002,651	6%	561,852,593	6%
50-54	432,933,595	6%	456,912,075	6%	538,407,563	6%	536,256,790	6%
55-59	376,707,354	5%	435,076,543	5%	477,884,240	6%	514,397,708	6%
60-64	312,829,731	4%	395,315,836	5%	420,278,447	5%	499,715,285	5%
65-69	261,069,786	3%	328,603,593	4%	384,161,473	4%	426,393,586	5%
70-74	186,515,363	2%	252,309,251	3%	326,393,338	4%	352,004,425	4%
75-79	121,487,486	2%	187,609,225	2%	244,292,111	3%	291,674,105	3%
80+	142,172,603	2%	198,903,705	2%	296,688,152	3%	415,736,479	5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

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